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Abstract—DTLS is becoming the de facto standard for com-
munication security in the Internet of Things. In order to run
the DTLS protocol one needs to establish keys between the
communicating devices. The default method of key establishment
requires X.509 certificates and a Public Key Infrastructure, an
approach which is often too resource consuming for small IoT
devices. DTLS also supports the use of pre-shared keys and raw
public keys. These modes are more lightweight, but they are not
scalable to a large number of devices.
We present Scalable Security with Symmetric Keys (S3K), a key
management architecture for the resource constrained Internet of
Things. S3K provides a flexible and scalable way of establishing
keys between resource constrained IoT devices. S3K enables
devices that have no previous, direct security relation to use
DTLS with either pre-shared symmetric keys or raw public
keys established and authorized during the DTLS handshake.
We implement S3K in the Contiki OS and evaluate it on real
IoT hardware. Our evaluation shows that S3K is feasible in
constrained environment and at the same time scalable to a large
number of devices.
Note to Practitioners: Key management is one of the hardest
problems in cyber security. It is even more challenging in
the Internet of IoT considering that most things are resource-
constrained. Therefore, IoT devices either end-up using the
symmetric cryptography with pre-shared key mode or asym-
metric cryptography with raw public keys (RPK) mode. These
modes either require a pre-provisioning of all expected trusted
clients in individual nodes before deployment or requires out-
of-band validation of RPKs. Also, if the number of clients
that a node would communicate with varies dynamically,
this would demand frequent re-provisioning of each trusted
client to the individual nodes. The approach based on pre-
provisioning and re-provisioning of trusted keys is certainly
not scalable and requires a continuous management of security
policies. We therefore propose a solution that is scalable
and does not require pre-provisioning or re-provisioning the
individual nodes with keys for all future trusted clients. The
basic approach is to establish shared keys between resource
servers and a trust anchor. When a client wants to establish a
trust relationship with a resource server it requests a key from
a trust anchor. The trust anchor asserts a secret key or a public
key of the client that can be conveyed to the resource server.
Index Terms—DTLS, Scalability, Keys, Security, CoAP, 6LoW-
PAN, Internet of Things
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE most frequently used security protocol on the Internetis TLS (often in conjunction with HTTPS) [1][2]. In the
Internet of Things (IoT), TLS can often not be used, since
it requires TCP as underlying transport protocol, and many
IoT applications use UDP instead. The IETF has developed
Datagram TLS (DTLS) [3], a UDP based variant of TLS,
which is therefore commonly applied in IoT settings.
Both TLS and DTLS define a handshake protocol in order
to initiate a secure session between a client and a server.
The protocol requires X.509 certificates and a corresponding
verification infrastructure. Since such an infrastructure is often
not viable for large deployments of small IoT devices, such
as sensor networks, additional protocols have been developed,
to support the use of either raw public keys [4] or pre-shared
symmetric keys [5].
When using one of these new modes, an important issue
is key establishment, especially when the client has no direct
prior relation to the server. Since a client might only have an
ephemeral relation to a specific server, disclosing the server’s
symmetric key to the client in the pre-shared key mode is not
a good solution. Large scale distribution of raw public keys is
also not viable.
Protocols like Kerberos [6] have been used to solve exactly
this problem for a long time, by using a Key Distribution
Center (KDC) - a Trusted Third Party (TTP) - that generates
and distributes ephemeral keys to clients, without disclosing
the secret shared key of the server. For many Internet appli-
cations there is also a TTP involved. For example, in order
to handle some degree of flexibility in authorizing access to
resources, an Authorization Server is assumed that provides
trusted assertions to servers about requesting clients [7].
A similar setting is anticipated and even more needed for
IoT applications, since constrained devices may typically need
support with authorization management as well as session key
establishment. Examples of IoT applications which benefit
from trusted third party support include Smart Metering,
Building Automation, Personal Health Monitoring and Indus-
trial Control Systems (see ACE in Section III).
However in addition to message sizes, the number of
messages exchanged has a negative impact on the performance
of constrained devices, so in order to reduce the overhead
this should be kept at a minimum. Introducing an additional
key exchange mechanism such as Kerberos, works against this
objective.
This article proposes Salable Security with Symmetric Keys
(S3K) a framework that comprises two schemes to establish
2a trust relation between communication partners that have no
previous, direct relationship.
The first approach is similar to Kerberos, but it integrates
seamlessly with both TLS and DTLS without requiring any
changes to the original protocols, in particular no extra round
trips are needed. In a dynamically changing setup of clients
and servers, leveraging an existing TTP, this approach allows
to establish a new pre-shared symmetric key between client
and server within the DTLS/TLS handshake without disclosing
the secret key of the server.
The second approach applies to raw public keys and also
integrates seamlessly with both DTLS and TLS: The TTP
issues a symmetric key based assertion of the client public
key, which the client can use as certificate in the handshake.
This also has the advantage of being much more lightweight
than a X.509 certificate and not requiring any PKI associated
processing.
Furthermore our framework can be used to expire keys on
devices that cannot reliably measure time, revoke existing keys
and prevent replay of previous key establishment messages.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: section
II presents the technological background of our framework,
including protocols and standards on which this framework is
based. In section III we present related work in the field of key
establishment for Internet of Things. Section IV presents the
architecture that is the basis of our framework; while section
V gives details on the implementation we did for testing
purposes. We present the results of measurements and other
evaluation preformed on our implementation in section VI and
finally draw conclusion on our work in section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Our baseline assumptions are constrained devices with about
10 KB of RAM and about 100 KB of persistent memory
(e.g. flash). This corresponds to class 1 devices according
to the terminology for constrained-node networks [8]. We
expect a significant number of these devices to be battery
powered, therefore they need to minimize network traffic, as
this is the largest power consumption factor compared to e.g.
cryptography [9][10].
Furthermore we assume the following communication pro-
tocol stack, although our approach can be applied to other
configurations as well:
• The application layer protocol is CoAP [11], using UDP
at the transport layer.
• CoAP runs on top of DTLS [3].
• IPv6 [12] is assumed to be the Internet layer protocol.
• 6LoWPAN [13] is used as adaptation layer protocol
between the Internet layer and the MAC and physical
layer.
• On the MAC and physical layer we assume that IEEE
802.15.4 [14] is used.
Currently security for the most constrained devices in the
Internet of Things is addressed mostly in terms of com-
munication security (confidentiality, integrity, possibly non-
repudiation) and key management. A variety of competing or
complementary protocols are in use, each of which has its own
security solution.
Many wireless sensor networks use the IEEE 802.15.4
protocol [14] at the physical layer. This protocol includes
some security services at the MAC sublayer, namely data
confidentiality, data authenticity and replay protection. It also
provides some features for key establishment needed for these
services, however it does not define how keys are to be
managed (cf. chapter 7 of [14]).
The ZigBee protocol [15] is based on IEEE 802.15 and
thus its security makes use of the IEEE 802.15 security
services. The ZigBee specification defines services for key
establishment, key transport, frame protection, and device
management, using a Trusted Third Party (TTP), called the
Trust Center, for key management (cf. chapter 4 of [15]).
The Bluetooth specification [16] includes a profile for
Bluetooth Low Energy, targeted at novel applications in the
healthcare, fitness, security, and home entertainment industries.
The security features of Bluetooth Low Energy are basically a
subset of the overall Bluetooth security features, including link
layer encryption and authentication using the CCM algorithm.
Furthermore the specification defines a Security Manager
component of the Bluetooth architecture, in charge of device
pairing and key management (cf. Volume 2 Part H, Volume 3
Part H and Volume 6 Part E of [16]).
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) maintains a
number of standards to enable constrained devices to use in-
ternet protocols. The 6LoWPAN [13] protocol is an adaptation
layer on top of IEEE 802.15.4 that allows the use of IPv6 in
low power lossy networks.
The CoAP protocol [11] is a specialized web transfer proto-
col at the application layer, for use with constrained nodes and
constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. CoAP security
is mainly defined through a binding to DTLS [17]. CoAP
enabled devices are expected to maintain some kind of Access
Control List (ACL) that specifies which other devices are
authorized to initiate a DTLS connection with them. How these
ACLs look like and how they are expected to be managed is
not specified in CoAP. CoAP defines four security modes, for
use with DTLS:
• NoSec mode has no security and DTLS is disabled.
• PreSharedKey (PSK) mode uses pre-shared secret keys.
• RawPublicKey (RPK) mode uses asymmetric keys with-
out certificates.
• Certificate mode uses regular X.509 certificates.
CoAP does not specify how these keys are established
except for the RPK mode. For RPK mode, the provisioning
of the necessary list of other public key identifiers that are
allowed to initiate DTLS sessions with a device is static, i.e.
it is assumed that this is done at commissioning time.
III. RELATED WORK
Different efforts are underway to address the security and
privacy challenges in billions of connected IoT devices. Pre-
viously, solutions have been developed to protect communi-
cation between resource-constrained IoT by using lightweight
IPsec [18], DTLS [17] [19], and link-layer security [18]. In
addition to the communication security, network security in the
IoT is also provided using an intrusion detection system [20],
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constrained node is also proposed [21]. Different standardiza-
tion efforts are also underway to provide security in the IoT.
The DTLS In Constrained Environments (DICE) working
group1 at IETF has been created with the goal of defining
profiles that adapt DTLS to constrained environments. Fur-
thermore the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
Environments (ACE) working group2 also at IETF has been
chartered in June 2014 with the goal of defining more concrete,
standardized ways of authenticating and authorizing access
involving constrained nodes and constrained networks.
The Open Mobile Alliance is working on a standard for
machine to machine (M2M) device management called OMA
Lightweight M2M [22]. This draft standard is based on CoAP
and DTLS, but it defines an additional communication security
binding for CoAP over SMS. Furthermore it defines an Access
Control List (ACL) structure, the management of these ACLs
and processing rules for reaching access control decisions
form these ACLs. The draft standard defines encodings for
establishing DTLS keys for the CoAP security modes, and
different methods for bootstrapping; it also specifies that
bootstrapping must use a secure session for sensitive security-
related data. The draft is silent on how this secure channel can
be set up in the absence of any pre-established credentials.
Kerberos [6] is an authentication protocol developed in 80-
ies. It allows two parties previously unknown to each other
to establish a shared secret key through the use of a trusted
third party, with whom both parties share a secret key already.
Our approach fundamentally tries to solve the same problem,
using a very similar architecture. However our approach is
integrated with DTLS, while using Kerberos would require
the constrained device to implement and perform the Kerberos
protocol in addition to session security such as DTLS.
Hernandez-Ramos et al. have designed an authentica-
tion and authorization framework for smart objects [23].
Their authentication approach is based on EAP over LAN
(EAPOL) [24] for security bootstrapping in order to establish
keys for DTLS. This burdens the constrained device with the
necessity to implement and execute the EAPOL protocol in
addition to DTLS, an approach which seems to be ill-adapted
to constrained devices.
Pereira et al. introduce a framework for authentication
and access control for CoAP-based Internet of Things [25].
Their framework leverages Kerberos [6] and RADIUS [26] to
provide authentication and access control. It proposes to use
either IPSec or DTLS for session security with the credentials
established with Kerberos and RADIUS. As with the previous
approaches this requires constrained devices to implement
and execute additional protocols in conjunction with DTLS,
thus we consider this to be too heavyweight for constrained
devices.
IV. S3K FOR DATAGRAM TLS
Key management is one of the hardest problems in cy-
ber security. It is even more challenging in the internet-
1https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dice/
2https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/ace/
connected IoT considering that most things are resource-
constrained (limited storage, processing, and bandwidth). On
the Internet today client devices authenticate servers (mostly
through a web browser) using a digital certificate, whereas
servers authenticate clients using a username or a password.
The lack of traditional user interfaces (such as keyboard and
display screen) on constrained things hinders the use of a
username and password for client authentication; this approach
also has inherent weaknesses that limit the use of dynamic
passwords which may render the use of constant passwords,
which introduces weaknesses.
Asymmetric cryptography with Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) is not always suitable for constrained environments
either, until we have smaller standardized certificates for
resource-constrained devices and economical methods of de-
veloping PKI with globally trusted certificates. Therefore,
constrained devices either end-up using the symmetric cryp-
tography with Pre-shared key (PSK) mode or asymmetric
cryptography with raw public keys (RPK) mode. These modes
either require a pre-shared key in a constrained node for each
remote client that wants to establish a secure connection with
the node, or requires out-of-band validation of RPKs. If a
node is expected to communicate with a large number of
clients this would require a pre-provisioning of all expected
trusted clients in individual nodes before deployment. Also,
if the number of clients that a node would communicate with
varies dynamically, for example pay-per-use setting, this would
demand frequent re-provisioning of each trusted client to the
individual nodes.
The approach based on pre-provisioning and re-provisioning
of trusted keys is certainly not scalable and requires a contin-
uous management of security policies. We therefore propose a
solution that is scalable and does not require pre-provisioning
or re-provisioning the individual nodes with keys for all future
trusted clients that intend to establish secure connections
with these nodes. Our solution requires only a single trusted
relationship between a constrained device and trust anchor.
Before presenting our solutions we introduce the termi-
nologies we will be using in this paper: resource server is a
resource-constrained device that offers one or more resources
such as temperature readings; client is a device that requests a
resource from a resource server; and trust anchor is a trusted
third-party that both resource server and client use to establish
trust relationship between them.
The basic approach is to establish shared keys between
resource servers and a trust anchor. When a client wants to
establish a trust relationship with a resource server it requests
a key from a trust anchor. The trust anchor asserts a secret
key or a public key of the client that can be conveyed to the
resource server. The assertion is performed such that the public
key is integrity protected and the secret key is confidentiality
and integrity protected. In the following sections we will
further elaborate and apply this technique to establish a secure
connection using the DTLS protocol with PSK and RPK based
on the asserted secret key or public key, respectively. Recall
that the DTLS is the standard security protocol for CoAP [11],
a new web standard for the IoT.
The normal mode of operations for DTLS is to use X.509
4certificates, however other more lightweight solutions have
been developed, relying on pre-shared secret keys (PSK) [5]
or on raw public keys (RPK) [4] that are validated out of band
in an unspecified manner.
When using certificates, one can establish DTLS connec-
tions in a flexible scalable way provided that a PKI is present
and certificates are deployed to all participating entities. This is
clearly not a reasonable expectation in large scale deployment
of constrained IoT devices.
In PSK mode the communicating parties have to establish
a shared secret key before the DTLS session is initiated.
How that is done is not specified in the standard describing
PSK [5]. Basic PSK mode does not provide perfect forward
secrecy (PFS), meaning that if the pre-shared key is somehow
compromised, an attacker can decrypt the messages of previ-
ous sessions. There are PSK modes that provide PFS, using
Diffie-Hellman exchanges, but these are not the mandatory to
implement modes of CoAP. Furthermore anyone holding a pre-
shared key can impersonate the other communication partner,
especially if the same key is shared within a group.
In RPK mode raw public keys are used instead of X.509
certificates, thus transmission overhead is reduced and a PKI
is no longer necessary. However these keys still need to be
bound to a specific entity in order for the DTLS protocol to
be secure. Therefore some out-of-band method is assumed by
which the entities participating in a communication learn of
each other’s public keys.
The CoAP standard describes some measures that can be
used for provisioning RPKs or lists of RPKs, as e.g. a method
to derive a short identifier from the public key.
A. Datagram TLS with DerivedKey Mode
When performing the DTLS handshake in PSK mode, the
pre-shared keys of the communicating entities need to be
provisioned. One possible solution is to hard-code these keys
and identities for all possible future clients in a resource
server before deployment. This does not scale well in dynamic
settings.
A common approach, that is adopted by our solution, is to
use a trust anchor to establish keys and identities between
different resource servers and previously unknown clients.
This approach is more scalable and easier to manage.
In this approach a resource server and a trust anchor share
a secret key, which is stored in the resource server before
deployment. We denote this key by Kt. A trust anchor shares
a unique Kt with each resource server. Also, a resource server
can contain multiple unique Kt shared with different trust
anchors; for example, a resource server can offer a resource
A via an access through trust anchor TA and for a resource
B via an access through trust anchor TB . For simplicity, we
consider the case where a resource server shares a key with
only one trust server; this is also the typical case.
A client can request a PSK, denoted by Kc in this paper,
from the trust anchor, that in turn generates a Kc and a
psk identity and sends them to the client via a secure channel;
section IV-A4 discusses the creation of a secure channel
between a trust anchor and a client. The client uses the Kc
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Fig. 1: Sequence of required steps when a client C wants to
establish a secure DLTS PSK-based connection with a resource
server using our DerivedKey mode.
and psk identity during the DTLS handshake to establish a
secure connection with a resource server. Figure 1 illustrates
this process.
Upon receiving a DTLS connection request from a client
with psk identity as identify hint in the ClientKeyExchange
message, resource server parses the psk identity field and
proceeds with the derivation of Kc using the Kt and
psk identity. In the following section, we explain the deriva-
tion of psk identity and Kc.
1) psk identity Derivation: In order to provide additional
key management services, discussed in Section IV-A3, a nonce
is used as the psk identity field of the DTLS ClientKeyEx-
change message. A cryptographic nonce is a number that is
used only once in a cryptographic protocol. A trust anchor
generates the nonce as follows.
psk_identity = nonce = BASE64enc(
Kcprefix + TAid + Cid + RSid + Kcsize + seq_number
)
where Kcprefix is a 3-bytes constant value set to
{0x0C, 0x44, 0x4A}, which specifies the use of PSK
with our DerivedKey mode; TAid is a 1-byte value that
represents the identity of the trust anchor, which a resource
server can use to select the right Kt; Cid is a 12-byte identity
of a client, which ensures that Kc is generated for a specific
client; RSid is a 12-byte identity of a resource server, which
ensures that client can only use Kc to access a specific
resource server; Kcsize is 1-byte value to represent the size
of Kc in bytes, which allows the flexibility to use different
key sizes; and seq number is a 8-byte sequence number
maintained by the trust anchor and resource server, which is
discussed in section IV-A3.
The sequence number ensures that each nonce is unique.
In order to be able to use these byte values in the
psk identity that requires ASCII characters, we Base64 end-
code the resulting byte-string.
52) PSK Derivation: The pre-shared key (i.e. Kc) deriva-
tion approach is based on the data expansion method pro-
posed in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Ver-
sion 1.2 [1]. The data expansion function, denoted by
P hash(secret, data), uses a single hash function to expand
a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output. This
function is defined as
P_hash (secret, seed) =
HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) +
HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
where + indicates concatenation and A() is defined as:
A(0) = seed
A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1))
We can iterate P hash as many times as necessary to produce
the required quantity of data. For example, if P SHA256 is
being used a single iteration will produce 32 bytes or 256
bits. Using the SHA256 hash function if we want to generate
a 256-bit Kc, the data expansion method will be the following.
In our case, seed is psk identity and secret is Kt.
Kc = P_SHA256(Kt,psk_identity) =
HMAC_SHA256(Kt, A (1)+ psk_identity)
where
A (1) = HMAC_SHA256(Kt + A (0)) =
HMAC_SHA256(Kt + psk_identity)
In case we want to use 128-bit Kc, we can keep the first 128
bits and discard the rest.
3) Additional Key Management Services:
a) Unreliable Clocks: Constrained devices often have no
reliable means of measuring time, especially if they sleep
for extended periods, in order to conserve battery power.
Therefore date and time based mechanisms to ensure freshness
and expiration of keys work badly in such environments. Note
that the CC2538 platform we used for our implementation
includes a real time clock and is therefore able to reliably
measure time. However this cannot be expected of the smallest
devices which we target with this framework.
b) Key Freshness: The freshness security service defends
against replay attacks using the sequence number to mark
already used keys Kc. The sequence number counter is set
to zero when an association between a trust anchor and a
resource server is made, i.e., when a new Kt is provisioned to
a resource sever and a trust anchor. When a sequence number
range gets exhausted a new Kt must be provisioned before
setting the sequence number counter back to zero.
A trust anchor increments a sequence number by 1 each
time it generates a new Kt. The resource server increases
the sequence number each time it gets a valid DTLS con-
nection request and the connection is successful. For each
trust anchor (as a resource server can have multiple trust
anchors), a resource server maintains a window of most
recently verified sequence numbers using the sliding window
procedure descried in RFC 2402 [27]. A request for a new
DTLS connection by a client is considered as fresh if the
sequence number is new and falls within the sliding window,
or to the right of window. For each received request for a
DTLS connection, the resource server must first check the
nonce’s sequence number part before moving on to the further
verification of nonce and generation of Kc. The sliding window
ensures that keys can be used in different order than they
were issued. This is important, since the delays in especially
wireless IoT networks can cause requests to arrive in different
order than the one they were sent in.
c) Key Expiration: Security keys often have a lifetime
and hence an expiry date. The sequence number part of the
nonce can be used to expire the Kc - nonce pair. The size
of the sliding window described in the previous paragraph
provides a weaker form of expiration in the absence of reliable
time measurements. When the sequence number associated to
a key Kc drops out of the sliding window, it is considered to
be expired.
d) Key Revocation: It is sometime desirable to revoke
keys before they expire. For example if a client is compro-
mised or a service/resource agreement between a resource
server and a client is void. In such cases a trust anchor can
send a key revocation message to a resource server with the
sequence number of the key (Kc) it wants to revoke. The
resource server marks the key as used in the sliding window
thereby making it unusable.
4) Secure Connection between a Trust Anchor and a Client:
The key exchange between a trust anchor and client must be
carried out on a secure channel. We assume that both trust
anchors and clients are not so constrained devices and can
establish a secure connection using the conventional commu-
nication security protocols such as TLS/DTLS and IKE/IPsec.
How this is done is outside the scope of this paper and is well
known. Upon request for a resource, a trust anchor can verify
if a client is allowed to access a resource from a resource
server. A trust anchor or a third party can for example run
a commercial service to control protected access to resource
servers. How this is done is also outside the scope of this
paper.
B. Datagram TLS with AuthorizedPublicKey Mode
The pre-shared key Kt can also be used to perform the
DTLS handshake in the Raw Public Key (RPK) mode. Our
AuthorizedPublicKey (APK) mode is analogous to the RPK
but without the need for out-of-band validation of public keys.
Figure 2 shows the APK exchange between a client and a
resource server plus the full handshake using this mode. For a
DTLS handshake with a resource server, a client requests an
APK from a trust anchor that in turn creates an authorization
certificate, protects it with a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) using the key Kt, and sends it to the client along
with the public key of the resource server to which this APK
applies. During the DTLS handshake in the RPK mode, a
client replaces the RPK with the APK (i.e. the authorization
certificate). The resource server verifies the APK and proceeds
with the DTLS handshake in the RPK mode. For this new
mode we require similar changes as were required by the
RPK mode [4], i.e., we need a new certificate type and a
new structure; we specify these extensions in Section IV-B1.
Note that the resource server sends an empty certificate list in
the Certificate message, since the public key of the resource
6Resource Server (RS)
1. Request APK
Trust Anchor (TA) Client (C)
2. Process 
Authorization
3. APK + public key PubK_RS
ClientHello [client_certificate_type= APK]
KtKt
public key PubK_C
HelloVerifyRequest
ClientHello [client_certificate_type= APK]
ServerHello [server_certificate_type=X.509]
Certificate (empty list) [client_certificate_type= APK]
ServerKeyExchange
CertificateRequest
ServerHelloDone
Certificate [MacCert]
ClientKeyExchange
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished
Flight 1
Flight 2
Flight 3
Application Data
Flight 4
Flight 5
Flight 6
Fig. 2: A full DTLS handshake with our AuthorizedPublicKey
mode.
server is already provided to the client during the initial
exchange; step 2 in Figure 2. The use of X.509 is just an
indication that allows us to send an empty certificate list in
the Certificate message. In response to the resource server’s
CertificateRequest message, the client sends MacCert (defined
in Section IV-B1) in the Certificate message.
The use of smaller sized APK makes the client’s Certificate
message very lightweight compared to X.509 certificates. The
use of a MAC further reduces the overhead compared to using
asymmetric signatures. Our APK is in fact the RPK of the RFC
7250 [4] with an additional MAC.
1) Structure of the APK Extension: We call the new certifi-
cate type AuthorizedPublicKey and the new structure is named
MacCert.
struct {
select(certificate_type) {
//Our proposed certificate type
case AuthorizedPublicKey:
MacCert certificate;
// RawPublicKey certificate defined in [RFC7250]
case RawPublicKey:
opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2ˆ24-1>;
// X.509 certificate defined in [RFC 5246]
case X.509:
ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2ˆ24-1>;
// Additional certificate type based on TLS
// Certificate Type Registry
};
} Certificate;
The MacCert structure is defined as follows:
struct {
opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2ˆ24-1>
RS6BRClientTA
HTTP/TLS IPv6/DTLS/CoAP 6LoWPAN/DTLS/CoAP
      
Fig. 3: Our IoT setup that is used to evaluate DTLS with
scalable symmetric keys.
opaque trust_anchor_id;
uint32 sequence_number;
MACAlgorithm mac_algorithm;
uint8 mac_length;
opaque MAC[mac_length];
} MacCert;
The ASN.1 subjectPublicKeyInfo is defined in the RFC
7250[4]. MACAlgorithm is specified in RFC 5246 [1] and
the mac algorithm parameter is a function defined as follows:
MAC = M(key, message)
where key is Kt and message is the certificate with an empty
MAC. We also need the extended client hello and server hello
messages defined in the RFC 7250 with AuthorizedPublicKey
as certificate type.
A resource server can verify the public key of client that
is sent in the ClientCertificate message by (i) searching the
trust anchor id in its list of trust anchors, (ii) checking the va-
lidity of sequence number and ASN.1 subjectPublicKeyInfo,
and (iii) verifying the MAC using the key Kt. If any of them
fails the resource server must abort the handshake.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In order to verify and evaluate S3K DerivedKey mode we
implemented the three agents (client, TA, and RS) in an IoT
setup shown in Figure 3.
(i) The client is implemented in Java as a desktop applica-
tion.
(ii) The TA is implemented in Java as a web service appli-
cation.
(iii) The RS is implemented in C on a constrained device.
The TA web service is continuously running to accept the
DTLS key request as HTTP requests over a secure TLS chan-
nel. The client is also connected to a Border Router (BR) over
the serial port utilizing Serial Line Internet Protocol (SLIP).
The RS is a part of a 6LoWPAN network and connected to
the BR over the IEEE 802.15.4 low power radio.
A. Resource Server Implementation
Major part of the development effort was spent on the
RS implementation. The RS is implemented on a constrained
device, but it should still provide enough memory and com-
putational power to run the operating system, IP stack, DTLS,
CoAP protocol as well as our proposed S3K scheme, and a
test application. Another important requirement for the device
is presence of a 802.15.4 radio unit.
We therefore choose the CC2538 platform, with is based on
a 32 bit ARM-Cortex M3 core, with a built-in 802.15.4 radio
unit. Furthermore the CC2538 has some cryptographic accel-
erators that support SHA2 and AES-128/256 and a hardware
7pseudo random number generator that can be initialized with
random numbers generated by radio module.
We use the CC2538DK [28] development kit. The de-
velopment board has CC2538F512RKU processor, 512kB of
internal flash or ROM, 32kB of RAM, clock frequency of
32MHz, 2.1V voltage, processor core current of 13mA, and
oscillator frequency of 32.768kHz. Moreover, the CC2538DK
development board has 4 built in LEDs, accelerometer and
a light sensor [29] that helps to build a test application for
protocol evaluation.
1) Operating System: In this paper we use Contiki, an open
source operating system designed for the IoT [30]. One of the
important benefits of this operating system is support for the
IP protocol stack. This includes IPv6 (with 6LoWPAN), TCP,
and UDP protocols. In addition to this, the Contiki OS comes
with built in CoAP implementation Erbium [31]. It supports
both server and client modes and has a small code overhead.
We use Erbium for the evaluation.
2) DTLS library: We use the tinyDTLS [32] library as
a basic implementation of DTLS. TinyDTLS is an open
source library implemented in C and optimized for constrained
devices running the Contiki OS. It supports the PSK mode
with the TLS PSK AES 128 CCM 8 cipher suite that is
mandatory to implement in CoAP. Other DTLS alternatives
include GnuTLS [33], openSSL [34] and MatrixSSL [35]. We
extend the tinyDTLS library to support S3K and implement
the following additional features.
• The software base pseudo random number generation
(PRNG) is replaced with hardware accelerator for PRNG
generation.
• Functions that utilize the SHA2 hardware accelerator
for HMAC calculation were implemented to replace the
software based SHA256 calculation.
• DTLS session handler was extended to keep a pointer
for custom information and search of existing session by
custom information.
• The new event DTLS EVENT CLOSED was declared.
This event is send when the DTLS session is about to
be closed but session information was not removed yet.
It can be handled by the event function together with
DTLS EVENT CONNECTED.
These modifications are not application specific and treated
as the part of the DTLS library.
3) DTLS and CoAP integration: We integrate the tinyDTLS
library and the Erbium CoAP implementation to support
secure CoAP (CoAPs). This integration supports enabling and
disabling of security based on the IS SECURE flag that we
add. We also implement callback methods to process secure
CoAP messages.
The coap receiver process receives the new packet and
checks by destination port number if it has to be processed
as secure or insecure. If the data was sent to insecure CoAP
connection the request is processed as any other CoAP request.
Figure 4 shows the flow of secure and insecure messages in
the integrated CoAP-DTLS.
4) S3K Key Derivation: The key derivation logic in the
DerivedKey mode is implemented as a function that accepts
the PSK identity and length of the PSK identity in bytes and
Coap_receiver 
receives data
Secure 
connection
Call dtls_handle 
message
Request parsing
Record protocol
Call get_from_peer Prcessing the 
handshake 
message
Call coap_receive to 
process
Call 
coap_send_message
Call dtls_write
Send to peer
NoYes
Yes No
Insecure request 
allowed
Skip request
No
Process 
request
Yes
Fig. 4: Message processing flowchart of a secure and insecure
CoAP-based communication.
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Assemble PSK 
structure Return PSK
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Fig. 5: S3K key derivation process.
returns the status of the operation (0 if key is generated and
non-0 if an error occurs), the key, the length of the key in
bytes, the TA identifier and the sequence number from the
nonce. The key derivation flowchart is shown in Figure 5.
In order to prevent redundant base64 decoding, the function
verifies that the length of the PSK identity field is at least
37 (the size of a nonce) but does not exceed 60 bytes (the
maximum length of nonce Base64 encoding). If the length
of PSK identity is within the acceptable limit the nonce is
decoded from Base64. If the result of the decoding is exactly
37 bytes long, the data of the nonce is verified in the following
order: first 3 bytes of the nonce identify the derived key mode
and are equal to 0x0C, 0x44, 0x4A; the RS identifier specified
in the nonce is equal to the RS identifier of the device; the
TA identity is known to the device; the sequence number of
the nonce satisfies requirements of the sliding window of the
specified TA. If all checks of the nonce are successful then
the derived key is generated and truncated if it is required by
the key size parameter of the nonce. As the implemented key
management protocol is designed to be used together with the
DTLS protocol the key generation function utilizes the HMAC
8calculation module of the tinyDTLS library to reduce the code
footprint.
5) Key revocation: The key revocation is implemented as a
CoAP resource that is not protected with transport security.
The resource utilizes the DELETE method of the CoAP
protocol and the request is sent as a raw sequence of bytes
in the payload. The request is not encrypted but protected
with a MAC. As HMAC calculation may cost significant
computational resources, following two conditions are verified
when the new key revocation request is received: (i) the RS
identity specified in the request has to be equal the resource
identity of the device, and (ii) either the DTLS session for the
sequence number specified in the key revocation request exists
or key is marked as unused in sliding window. If verification
above is successful the MAC is calculated with key Kt and
compared with the received MAC. In case the message sender
identity is not confirmed the request is ignored. Otherwise the
sliding window is updated and the DTLS session is terminated
if it exists.
6) Test Application in RS: The test application is imple-
mented as a CoAP resource that is protected with the DTLS
protocol and performs a simple function of switching on
and off LEDs on the evaluation board. In addition to this it
defines callback functions for tinyDTLS context and handles
tinyDTLS events. Among other things it updates the sliding
window information when the DTLS handshake is finished and
the session is marked as connected. T he modified tinyDTLS
library supports both pure PSK mode and derived key mode.
The test application also contains service code to configure
the DTLS context and start CoAP server. In the RS we
also implement the sliding window mechanism for sequence
number freshness.
B. Border router
The task of the border router is to connect our client, which
is using wired Internet, to the RS which uses the wireless IEEE
802.15.4 radio. The border router is a CC2538DK board that
is programmed with a RPL border router application. That
application can be found in Contiki OS examples. The router
is connected to PC with the Serial Line Internet protocol
(SLIP). In order to run the SLIP protocol the tunslip6 tool
from Contiki 2.7 distribution was used. This tool creates
the additional network interface with the specified prefix and
allows IP packet exchange between the PC and the RPL border
router.
C. Trust anchor implementation
The Trust Anchor is implemented in Java as a web appli-
cation that provides a REST service with 2 endpoints.
The key generation endpoint (token/generate) creates the
new nonce and derived key pairs. As input it accepts the JSON
object that contains the alias of the client that sends the request
and the alias of the RA that needs to be accessed. The TA finds
existing RS and client identifiers by aliases in the database,
generates the nonce and the key and increments the sequence
number counter. The response is a string representation of the
constant
code data variables total
S3K 1636 B 48 B 24 B 1708 B
key management 392 B
(part of S3K)
tinyDTLS 19368 B 140 B 2084 B 21592 B
TABLE I: Code size and memory overhead of S3K Derived-
Key mode
JSON object that contains nonce encoded as Base64 and the
session key Kc.
The key revocation endpoint (token/revoke) is designed to
send key revocation requests. As input it accepts the JSON
object that contains the alias of the RA were the key has to be
revoked and the sequence number of that key. The TA finds
the the RS identifier by the alias and sends key revocation
request to the selected RS.
The REST service is secured with the TLS protocol based
on self-signed X.509 certificates. Since our main goal is to
evaluate the part of the protocol that have to run on the
constrained devices we did not implement any authentication.
D. Client implementation
The client application is implemented in Java. It is designed
to execute three main functions: obtain the nonce and the
derived key Kc from the TA, perform the DTLS handshake
with the RS using granted nonce, and send the CoAP request
over the DTLS record protocol to RS.
The nonce and the derived key are obtained in a JSON
object from the key generation endpoint. In order to implement
the DTLS handshake and the secure CoAP communication we
used the Scandium open source DTLS implementation and the
Californium CoAP implementation. These frameworks were
selected because they provide all necessary functionality and
are easy to integrate.
VI. EVALUATION
In order to show the feasibility of S3K in constrained
environments, we evaluate it in an IoT setup shown in Figure 3.
A. Memory Overhead
In order to evaluate code size and memory usage the arm-
none-eabi-size utility was used. For more detailed information
about RAM and ROM usage we used the tool arm-none-
eabi-objdump. Both tools are included in the GNU toolchain
for ARM processor utility. To perform a measurement for
a certain functional part of the code that is in charge of
specific functionality, it is removed from compilation with the
#define C directive and the value is calculated as delta of the
application size with and without the functional part.
The total size of S3K is 1708 bytes including 1636 bytes of
code, 48 bytes of static information and 24 bytes allocated for
global variables. This number also includes the 16 bytes long
RS identifier and 78 bytes long key Kt. The key management
functionality in S3K accounts for a total of 392 bytes.
The total size of the tinyDTLS library (including the
necessary modifications) is 21592 bytes. This code footprint
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revocations.
includes 19368 bytes of program, 140 bytes of constant data
and 2084 bytes allocated for global variables.
Table I summarizes these findings.
B. Time and Energy Overhead
The computational time is measured with the Contiki En-
ergest [36] module. This module is based on the real time
clock and measures usage time of different platform units
separately (CPU time, CPU time in low power mode, radio
listening time and radio transmission time). The real time
clock on CC2538EM platform works on 32.786kHz frequency
that allows to perform measurements with resolution 0.03 ms.
The Energest module accumulates the number of real time
clock ticks in 64 bit unsigned values since its activation. That
capacity is more than enough to measure the computational
time of the most of S3K operations.
Energy consumption is calculated from time that is mea-
sured with the Energest module according to the following
equation.
E = U * I * t
In this equation U is a power supply voltage taken from plat-
form documentation, I is an average current for the respective
module from processor specification and t is the time value
measured with the Energest. The energy value is calculated for
each model and then summed up to take into account not only
energy used by processor for computation, but also potentially
lost radio duty cycles.
The energy consumed by S3K is measured separately for
the key derivation function and for the key revocation function.
Figure 6 shows the energy consumes on key handling part
of S3K. The key derivation using the software SHA256
computation takes 75.47 ticks or 2.30 milliseconds on average
while the same computation with SHA2 hardware accelerator
takes 14.6 ticks or 0.45 milliseconds. The key revocation with
and without SHA2 accelerator takes 73.7 ticks (2.25 ms) and
11.4 ticks (0.35 ms) respectively. The energy in nJ is calculated
from the time using the above formula.
We also measure the energy overhead of individual DTLS
handshake messages. For that the processing time is measured
starting from receiving the message and until the reply is
sent. Moreover the total handshake time starting from the
first ClientHello message and ending with processing of the
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Fig. 7: Energy spent on different DTLS handshake messages
in S3K DerivedKey mode.
last Finished message was measured to get an idea about the
maximum number of handshakes that can be processed by the
device within a unit of time. Figure 7 shows the energy spend
on individual handshake message plus the total energy spend
on the full handshake process.
The minimum time for the complete handshake for SHA256
software computation is 533.05 ms and average time is 775.05
ms. In case the SHA2 hardware accelerator is used the
minimum and average time is 511.65 ms and 711.11 ms
respectively.
The average RTT value was 362.95 ms. Hence, the average
OWD value is 181.48 ms and we can assume that attacker can
send 8.44 requests per second.
In order to evaluate how many requests can be send by
an attacker per second we measured the Round Trip Time
(RTT) between client and server with a ping request. As a ping
request processing time is negligible and the network consists
of two nodes so the route is deterministic we assume the One
Way Delay (OWD) is a half of RTT. Hence, the number of
requests that can be sent by an attacker during the period of
time is the length of the period divided by OWD.
The measurements were performed with ContikiMAC radio
duty cycle protocol [37]. The Java client running on the PC
was sending either a DTLS handshake requests sequence or
a key revocation request the RS running on the embedded
platform, depending on the evaluated function. Data was
collected 30 times for each function.
The collected data was analyzed to make a conclusion
about performance of the S3K framework and its resistance
for Denial of Service (DoS) and battery-drain attacks that are
specific for constrained devices.
C. Evaluation Discussion
Analysis of the key management framework code footprint
shows that key derivation and revocation functions take 7.9%
of the total DTLS implementation. The key derivation function
takes 6.0% of total computational time per handshake. SHA2
hardware acceleration has a significant impact on the key
derivation and revocation processing time for DTLS handshake
messages. The accelerator speeds up the key derivation com-
putation 5.11 times and the key revocation computation 6.43
times. Also the accelerator speeds up overall computation time
of the handshake 4.37 times.
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We found out, by comparing overall handshake time with
and without SHA2 hardware acceleration, that optimization
of the computational time has almost no impact on total
handshake time. Hence, the key derivation has no significant
impact on total DTLS handshake time.
1) Attack Analysis: We analyze S3K for the battery-drain
attack and DoS attacks. The battery-drain attack can be
performed either by sending the sequence of key revocation
requests with well-structured valid data but wrong MAC or by
series of attempts to perform a DTLS handshake with well-
structured and acceptable nonce. In case an attacker tries to
send key revocation requests we assume that 8.44 requests per
second can be transmitted and a constrained device uses the
CR2032 coin battery with charge capacity 225 mAh, processor
spends 0.07µAh(2.25ms ∗ 16 ∗ 13mA) of battery charge per
second. In other words, it requires 38 days to drain the battery
with this method, which means that this type of attack is
almost unfeasible.
In order to analyze the feasibility of the battery-drain attack
we assume the worst case that an attacker can perform a
handshake in minimal handshake time (once in 0.5ms). S3K
requires that the full DTLS handshake should be performed
to authenticate the client. We measured that it takes 38.64 ms
to reject the client with valid nonce and invalid key. In this
case the processor spends 0.28µAh(38.64ms ∗ 2 ∗ 13mA) of
battery charge per second. In other words, it requires 9.3 days
of continuous sending in order to drain the battery. Again this
type of attack can be considered unfeasible.
A denial of service attack can be considered feasible and
successful if an attacker can send requests to the resource
server that make it unresponsive. An attacker can perform
this either by sending requests that require significant time
to be processed or requests that block shared resources. As
with battery-drain attack we analyze if DoS attack is feasible
either by sending key revocation requests or by performing a
handshake. Processing of each key revocation request without
SHA2 accelerator takes 2.3 ms. Hence, the processor can
service 434.7 requests per second that is much more that 8.44
requests per second that can be serviced by the network.
In DTLS handshake ChangeCipherSpec message requires
the longest processing time of 17.89 ms. Hence, the processor
can service 55.90 requests per second. That is more than
amount of requests that can be transmitted over the network.
So the DoS attack cannot be performed on the DTLS hand-
shake.
At the same time the problem comes from the DTLS
protocol specification. The DTLS state machine is initialized
on the Resource Server right after the ClientHello message
with valid cookie is received. Since a constrained device can
handle a very limited number of slots for DTLS sessions (in
some cases the device can handle only 1 session) the potential
attacker may perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by
sending ClientHello messages and keeping all session slots
busy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mandated by CoAP and recommended by the OMA
Lightweight M2M and the IPSO alliance, DTLS is becoming
the de facto security standard for the Internet of Things.
However, only the certificate-based DTLS provides scalability
but requires heavyweight PKI with certificate validation. Con-
sidering the constrained nature of IoT devices, the certificate-
based DTLS mode is not feasible for the IoT. The other DTLS
modes that are based on symmetric keys and raw public keys
are comparatively lightweight but are not scalable to a large
number of IoT devices.
We have proposed, implemented, and evaluated a scalable
security solution with symmetric keys (S3K) for the IoT. We
have shown that S3K is lightweight and feasible to use in
resource-constrained devices, and at the same time it is scal-
able to a large number of IoT devices. Our S3K architecture
neither requires pre-provisioning of multiple pre-shared keys
nor the need for out-of-band validation of public keys.
As a proof of concept, in this paper we have implemented
S3K for the DTLS pre-shared key mode. In future, we plan to
implement S3K for the DTLS with raw public keys and also
for the other cyber security protocols such as IPsec/IKE.
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